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AN EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS OF THE INSURANCE MARKET 





Each insurance product per se is identical but the insurance companies that sell this 
identical insurance product are not necessarily identical. Because the nature of insurance 
is to cover damages from accidents, for example, consumers hope to get their insurance 
moneys quickly from their insurance companies when accidents happen. In this study, 
this is interpreted as “aftercare” and all insurance companies incorporate it into their 
strategies. The insurance companies in the market are assumed to compete not only on 
price (insurance rate) but also on quality (level of aftercare). Thus, it is natural that the 




Consumers have to decide from which insurance company they purchase an insurance 
product. These decisions can be affected by several factors. 
The most common factor is price. If a decision on insurance, in a competitive market, 
can be explained by the level of price alone, all insurance companies would set the same 
price, as a result of Bertrand competition. However, previous studies have confirmed the 
existence of price dispersion in the insurance market. For example, Jung (1978) has 
proved that there is price dispersion on identical automobile liability insurance in 
Chicago, Illinois and there are statistically significant differences when insurance 
companies are classified by distribution system. Mathewson (1983), Dahlby and West 
(1986), and Posey and Yavas (1995) have argued that price dispersion stems from the 
search costs of consumers. Berger et al. (1989) presented empirical evidence on 
switching costs and differential prices. Schlesinger and Schulenburg (1991, 1993) 
explained price dispersion according to three factors: product differentiation, search cost, 
and switching cost simultaneously. 
In previous studies, other factors in the insurance market are considered to explain price 
dispersion. One of these is coverage. Undoubtedly, all consumers prefer more coverage 
than less. However, other things being equal, it seems that coverage is not definitive to the 
existence of price dispersion. This can be explained by the following three reasons. First, 
in general, almost all of the insurance companies offer identical insurance products 
because the regulator will not be allowed to offer any other type of insurance product. 
Even if there were different insurance products, courts have frequently said that they are 
same (McDowell, 1989). Second, as McDowell (1989) has noted, even if there were total 
deregulation of insurance products, the similarity of insurance products would continue 
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because it is much more expensive to custom-make or tailor an insurance product for each 
consumer than to sell a standard one. Third, because insurance products are invisible and 
defined prior to purchase, it may be too difficult for common consumers to understand 
their contents completely. Thus, many consumers may not be fully aware of the contents 
of insurance products when they purchase them. 
Another factor is the quality level. Schlesinger and Schulenburg (1991, 1993) have 
pointed out that all insurance companies are not necessarily identical even if all the 
insurance products are identical because it is possible to set different quality levels among 
insurance companies.1 Furthermore, Schlesinger and Schulenburg (1991, 1993) have 
provided quality for insurance companies’ reputation, solvency characteristics, marketing 
methods, claim-handling procedures, and so on. In the real world, all the above attitudes 
are compounded. However, to the extent that the scope of this paper is restricted to the 
Japanese insurance market, it can be considered that claim-handling procedures are the 
most meaningful factor. Because the nature of insurance is to cover the damage arising 
from an accident, consumers hope to get insurance money promptly from their insurance 
companies when an accident happens. This can be interpreted as “aftercare”.2 
In contrast, at least until now, when Japanese consumers purchase an insurance product, 
they may not regard other attitudes, such as solvency, as important because perhaps only a 
small number of insurance companies have gone bankrupt since World War Ⅱ. In Japan, 
the marketing of non-life insurance is mostly through agents and the marketing of life 
insurance is through insurance practitioners, except for some foreign insurance affiliates. 
Then because both non-life and life insurance policies are sold through a single 
distribution system, marketing methods can be considered as identical. 
In this paper, an attempt is made to analyze an insurance market where insurance 
companies not only offer insurance products but also provide aftercare if an accident 
happens. The model involved has two important features. 
First, Schlesinger and Schulenburg (1991), Gravelle (1994) and Tsutsui et al. (2000) 
have analyzed a horizontal differentiated insurance market that is associated with 
“variety”. However, because consumers may prefer more aftercare than less, this paper 
indicates the vertical differentiation that is associated with “quality”. 
Second, my model differs from general vertical differentiated models in the following 
points. 
(1) The price in an insurance market is represented by the insurance rate, which equals 
the insurance premium divided by the insurance amount.3 Thus, unlike other markets, to 
set a price in an insurance market, each insurance company controls simultaneously the 
                                                        
1 In particular, Japanese non-life insurance products, such as fire, automobile and personal accident, are provided by 
identical clauses. The reason for this is to purchase reinsurance from reinsurance companies and to purchase 
coinsurance with other insurance companies. 
2 In the real world, the level of aftercare can be measured by the complaint ratio, which is based on the number of 
complaints received. See Doerpinghaus (1991), Wells and Stafford (1995) and Hoyt and Query (1999). 
3 Hereafter, in this paper “price” and “insurance rate” are used interchangeably. 
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two variables, insurance premium and insurance amount.  
(2) In general, though an insurance company can sell an insurance product at different 
prices to different consumers, it cannot set at different levels of quality to different 
consumers. For example, it is impossible to perform the differentiation that low-risk 
consumers receive their insurance money quickly and high-risk consumers receive their 
insurance money slowly. Furthermore, such a differentiation is prohibited by Japanese 
insurance law. In other words, regardless of the consumer’s risk type, all consumers who 
have the same insurance company receive same level of quality if an accident happens. 
(3) A consumer can receive aftercare only if an accident happens. This fact suggests 
that contrary to previous studies, two parameters, perception for quality and probability 
of an accident, are directly related to a consumer’s decision.  
This paper has two purposes: first, to analyze how a vertical differentiation in a 
competitive insurance market will affect price and secondly, to examine social welfare 
which is sum of consumer welfare and producer welfare as the regulator imposes 




In this section, the basic model is defined. There are two insurance companies, A and B. 
Suppose that two types of consumer exist in an insurance market, which include high-risk 
consumers with accident probability Hπ  and low-risk consumers with accident 
probability Lπ , and assume that 210 <<< HL ππ . Furthermore, assume that both 
insurance companies can observe the type of consumer without cost. Denote that HN  is 
the number of high-risk consumers and LN  is the number of low-risk consumers, where 
both are strictly positive. 
Let jiP  and 
j
iS  represent the insurance premium and the insurance amount, 
respectively, of a consumer of type i  purchased from the insurance company j . 
However, each insurance company cannot distinguish quality in accordance with each 
consumer. Thus, insurance company j  offers only one quality, [ ]maxmin , qqq j ∈ , 
regardless of type. Let [ )maxmin ,0 qq ∈  represent the minimum quality and 
( )∞∈ ,minmax qq  represent the maximum quality. Assume that both insurance companies 
have the same form of the cost function and the level of quality has no influence on 
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quantities ( ) 22jj aqqC =  where 0>a . Some examples of such quality features are the 
investment made educating employees and paying out insurance money more rapidly. It 
is assumed that both insurance companies cannot avoid paying this investment cost, even 
if they sell nothing. 
The utility of consumers is assumed to be separable in income and aftercare. Thus, the 
utility function is 
 
( ) ( )•+•= vuU        (1) 
 
where ( )•u  is the utility that is related to the income level and ( )•v  is the utility that is 
related to the aftercare. Each consumer has to choose the purchase of one unit from the 
more desirable insurance company. Now, applying Pratt (1964), the consumer’s utility, 





INCOINCO PrVarEPCE −=      (2) 
 
where CE  represents the certainty equivalent, EP  represents the expected payoff, and 
P  represents the (variable) payoff. Each variable that is indexed “INCO” is included in 
the utility ( )•u . r  is the degree of absolute risk aversion and it is assumed to be constant 
regardless of the consumer’s type and wealth. ( )•Var  denotes the variance. 
Consider INCOEP  in Equation (2). Let W  be the initial wealth. Denote D  as the value 
of an insurable asset and, for simplicity, there are only two states of the world, total loss 
and no loss. If a consumer of type i  purchases an insurance product { }jijiji SP ,≡δ  from 
insurance company j , this consumer is faced with the situation where his payoff 
becomes ji
j
i SDPW +−−  if an accident happens and 
j
iPW −  if an accident does not 
happen. Then INCOEP  can be written as 
 
( )jiijiINCO SDPWEP −−−= π .     (3) 
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Using Equation (3), ( )INCOPVar  in Equation (2) is given by 
 
( ) ( )( )21 jiiiINCO SDPVar −−= ππ .     (4) 
 
Substituting Equations (3) and (4) in Equation (2) gives 
 








INCO SDrSDPWCE −−−−−−= πππ .  (5) 
 
Let us next consider ( )•v . First, assume that ( )•v  is a linear function. Thus, the certainty 
equivalent, CARECE , which is related to the aftercare, is consistent with the expected 
utility, CAREEP . Both variables that are indexed “CARE” are included in the utility ( )•v . 
Further suppose that all consumers have their own quality valuation, say θ , which has 




CARECARE qEPCE θπ== .                   (6) 
 
Using Equations (1), (5), and (6), the maximization problem for consumer i  can be 
obtained by 
 
( ) ( )( ) jijiiijiijijij qSD




This paper sets out a two-stage game as follows: In the first stage, both insurance 
companies decide jq  simultaneously. Thus, this stage can be considered “choice of 
quality”. Without loss of generality, the quality that is offered by insurance company B is 
higher than that submitted by insurance company A. That is, AB qq > . In the second stage, 
both insurance companies decide the insurance product jiδ  simultaneously after they 
observe their qualities. Thus, this stage can be considered the “choice of price”. 
                                                        
4 According to Stafford and Wells (1996) and Hoyt and Query (1999), the different valuations among consumers are a 
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Let the marginal consumer who does not differentiate between two insurance companies 
be denoted by ∗iθ . For simplicity, the reservation prices for consumers for an insurance 
product are sufficiently high to ensure that all consumers are willing to purchase.5 Then 
 
( )







































θ   (8) 
 
where the first term shows the effect of the difference between their insurance premiums, 
the second term shows the effect of the difference between their insurance amounts, and 
the third term shows the effect of uncertainty of consumer i  after purchasing an 
insurance product. Further, all terms in the denominator include ( )AB qq − . Thus, all of 
the above effects decrease with increasing the value of ( )AB qq − . 
Equation (8) means that the consumers in the interval [ ]∗iθ,0  purchase from insurance 
company A while those in the interval [ ]1,∗iθ  purchase from insurance company B. 
Because θ  is uniformly distributed on [ ]1,0 , the aggregate demand for the insurance 
product A in the type i  market is ∗iθ  and for the insurance product B is 
∗− iθ1 . 
Two points should be noted. First, a difference in the accident probability leads to not 
only a difference in demand for aftercare but also a difference in the insurance product. 
Thus, though consumers have the same distributional form regardless of their type, it 
does not necessarily mean that ∗Hθ  and 
∗
Lθ  are identical. Second, in equilibrium, 
10 << ∗iθ  always holds. In other words, in equilibrium, both insurance companies have 
strictly positive demand.6 
Each insurance company is assumed to be risk neutral and the expected profit functions 
take the form 
 
                                                                                                                                                                  
function of age, education level, and claim record. 
5 More precisely, see Appendix A. 
6 Proof of this is deferred to the Appendix B. 
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A aqSPNSPNE −−+−=Π ∗∗ πθπθ ,  (9) 
 












B aqSPNSPNE −−−+−−=Π ∗∗ πθπθ . (10) 
 
Analysis of the Equilibrium 
 
In this section, a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium is derived. This equilibrium is 
obtained by backward induction. At the beginning of the equilibrium analysis, it is shown 
that, given each quality, both insurance companies set the price simultaneously. 
Substituting Equation (8) in Equations (9) and (10), the expected profit functions for the 
insurance companies become: 
 
( ) ( )








































































− ,        (11) 
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− .        (12) 
 
The first-order optimality conditions are 
 




































Π∂ πππ11  









r ππ ,    (14) 
 








Π∂ ππ 22  









r ππ ,    (15) 
 








Π∂ πππ11  













rSS πππ .  (16) 
 














π ,                                (17) 
 
DS Ai =













π ,    (19) 
 
DS Bi =
∗ .                                                            (20) 
 






. Thus, using the above equations, each 
equilibrium insurance rate may be written as 
                                                        





























π .     (22) 
 
The implications of the above equations are as follows: First, from Equations (21) and 
(22), each insurance rate includes not only the accident probability but also the additional 
costs of differentiating quality. In other words, both insurance companies offer an 
actuarially “unfair” price. Second, as compared with Equations (21) and (22), since 
AB qq >  then ∗∗ > Ai
B
i pp . Therefore, for all { }LHi ,∈ , the price of insurance product B is 
higher than the price of insurance product A. Third, Equations (18) and (20) show clearly 
that, in equilibrium, both insurance companies sell the full insurance. Ehrlich and Becker 
(1972) and Stiglitz (1977) have proved that with perfect information, in equilibrium, all 
insurance companies sell the full insurance. In this model, it is clear that this proposition 
is also satisfied even if product differentiation prevails. 
To consider the quality choices in the first stage of the game, substituting Equations (17) 
to (20) in Equations (11) and (12), each expected profit function can be written as 
 






A aqqqNE −−=Π ,     (23) 
 






B aqqqNE −−=Π       (24) 
 







q C <≡  and qq <min . Then one asymmetric subgame perfect 
equilibrium exists. Hence, the insurance companies set their qualities as follows: 8 
 
                                                                                                                                                                  
conditions for the maximization problem. Proof of this is deferred to Appendix C. 
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minqq
A =∗ ,       (25) 
 
qq B =∗ .        (26) 
 
















∗ ππ .      (28) 
 
Equations (27) and (28) can explain why the price of the low-risk consumer is 
sometimes higher than that of the high-risk consumer in the (Japanese) insurance market. 
In other words, even if a consumer is low risk, he or she may face a high price to purchase 
from insurance company B that offers high quality, and vice versa. In order to deal with 
this problem, circumstances are examined under which the above situation occurs. 
Mathematically, it needs to confirm the exogenous condition that satisfies ∗∗ > AH
B
L pp . 
Thus, subtracting ∗AHp  from 
∗B
Lp , it can be obtained that 
 








∗∗ ππππ .   (29) 
 
The first term shows the difference between the insurance rates; the second term is 
related to the difference between the quality levels. The first term is obviously strictly 
negative. Hence, it must be satisfied that the second term is strictly positive whenever 
∗∗ > AH
B
L pp . Simplification yields the condition 02 >− HL ππ . This condition means that 
the difference between the two accident probabilities is relatively small. 
However, the condition 02 >− HL ππ  is merely the necessary condition but not the 
sufficient condition for ∗∗ > AH
B
L pp . Consequently, even if this condition is satisfied, it is 
possible that ∗∗ > AH
B
L pp  is not satisfied. From (29), 
∗∗ > AH
B
L pp  is easily obtained when 
                                                                                                                                                                  
8 The following solutions are proved in Appendix D. 
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( )minqq −  is large. This implies that the more the quality is differentiated, the greater the 
probability that ∗∗ > AH
B




In this section, several comments are made on the equilibrium prices that are shown in 
Equations (27) and (28). By Equations (27) and (28), all equilibrium prices are affected 
by five kinds of exogenous variable: 1) accident probability, iπ ; 2) value of an insurable 
asset, D ; 3) number of consumers, iN ; 4) cost function form, a ; and 5) minimum 
quality level, minq . Now, consider the case where only one exogenous variable changes. 
 
1) accident probability ( iπ ) 






























.      (32) 
 
These derivatives have a number of interesting features. 
First, from Equations (30) and (31), all equilibrium prices are monotone increasing and 
convex functions of their own accident probability. This result implies that each price is a 
non-linear (convex) function of its own accident probability in spite of a perfectly 
informed insurance market. An intuitive explanation for this is provided. An increase in 
iπ  increases both the expected insurance money and the total aftercare cost. Expected 
insurance money is a linear function of its own accident probability whose slope is equal 
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to unity, while the aftercare cost is a convex function of its own accident probability 
because it leads to an increase, not only in the expected number in case of an accident, but 
also the equilibrium quality of insurance company B. 




























change in the insurance rates of insurance company B is larger than that of insurance 
company A because it only affects ∗Bq  while insurance company A always sets its quality 
minq . 
Third, by Equation (32), all equilibrium prices are monotone increasing functions of the 
other accident probability. This result can be explained as follows. An increase in kπ  
implies that a consumer of type k  would be more likely to desire high quality. Insurance 
company B raises its quality. This increase leads to an increase in the equilibrium prices 
of both types because of the additional quality cost. Moreover, its increase also increases 
the insurance rates of insurance company A. However, this feature stems not from the 
existence of the quality variable, but from the impossibility of quality differentiation 
between consumer types. If it were possible to set the quality in accordance with 
consumer types, an increase in kπ  would only affect the price and quality of type k . 
 
2) value of an insurable asset ( D ) 
 














p ji .       (34) 
 
Equations (33) and (34) indicate that all equilibrium prices are monotone decreasing and 
convex functions of D . The quality cost per insurance product is constant regardless of 
the insurance amount. Accordingly, the more the insurance amount increases, the more 
the quality cost per insurance amount decreases. Thus, an increase in the value of an 
insurable asset brings about a decrease in all equilibrium prices because, in equilibrium, 
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DS ji =
∗ . In other words, there are economies of scale with respect to quality cost. It can 
be also interpreted as “band grading” in the insurance institution. 
 
3) number of consumers ( iN ) 
 










.       (35) 
 
The intuition underlying this derivative (35) is readily shown. An increase in the number 
of consumers increases the fraction of the consumers who will be pressing a claim. Then, 
insurance company B increases its quality and the insurance rates of both insurance 
companies also increase. 
 
4) cost function form ( a ) 
 






p ji .       (36) 
 
An increase in a  implies that the cost function becomes steeper. It leads to a decrease in 
the quality of insurance company B and both insurance rates also decrease. 
 
5) minimum quality level ( minq ) 








p ji .        (37) 
 
Thus, an increase in the minimum quality level decreases all equilibrium prices 
because it limits the range in which the insurance companies can differentiate quality and 
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then they face an intensified price competition. 
 
The Effect of Minimum Quality Standards 
 
In this paper thus far, the situation where minimum quality level is an exogenous 
variable has been considered. However, in real life, the regulator often sets the minimum 
quality level endogenously. 
For example, consider the Japanese life insurance contract. In principle, it binds the 
insurance company to pay insurance money within five days after the procedural 
conditions have been completed. These contracts are ruled by the regulator and so all 
insurance contracts are almost identical. Namely, the time of payment, which is contained 
in the claims handling procedures, is the regulator’s endogenous variable. 
To cite another example, since 1996, a life insurance company would be permitted to 
enter the non-life insurance market in Japan, and vice versa. However, the regulator 
requested life insurance companies that are going to enter the non-life insurance market to 
employ their own assessors. This requirement means that a life insurance company must 
represent a certain quality level when entering in the non-life insurance market. 
In this section, the effect of the minimum quality standards on social welfare is analyzed. 
Several theoretical models of minimum quality standards have been developed, including 
Leland (1979), Ronnen (1991) and Valletti (2000). A common theme of these researchers 
is that minimum quality standards can reduce an extreme quality differentiation and raise 
quality. Imposing minimum quality standards necessarily improves consumer welfare. 
However, at the same time, producer welfare decreases because not only the price 
decreases but also the quality cost increases. Thus, it is not clear whether the imposition 
of minimum quality standards is desirable or not. 
First, consider consumer welfare. By Equations (18) and (20), all consumers purchase 
full insurance. Thus, a consumer of type i  derives the following utility from buying the 
insurance product jiδ . 
 
( ) ∗∗ +−= jiji qPWuU θπ .      (38) 
 




∈=∗θ .      (39) 
 
Let CW  be consumer welfare. Using Equations (38) and (39), then 
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min θθπθθπ . (40) 
 
In contrast, let PW  be producer welfare. It is equal to 
 







∗∗ ππ  







∗∗ ππ .   (41) 
 
Further, denote that the social welfare is SW . The form of SW  is 
 
PWCWSW += .       (42) 
 
Differentiating Equation (42) with respect to minq  
 
















Now, according to Leland (1979), to investigate whether the imposition of minimum 
quality standards is desirable or not, it needs to confirm whether Equation (43) at 



































































































⎛ +−′+ πππ . (44) 
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The sign of Equation (44) is ambiguous. Consider the situation where Equation (44) is 
positive. When there is greater marginal utility (that is, ( )•′u  is large), Equation (44) is 
positive. Thus, for the insurance market with small initial wealth (W  is small), a slight 
slope for the cost function ( a  is small), and a high value of an insurable asset ( D  is large), 
to impose minimum quality standards may be socially desirable. In contrast, the effect of 
accident probability ( iπ ) and the number of consumers ( iN ) have an ambiguous effect. 
These results can be described in detail. First, a decrease in a  leads to an increase in the 
quality of insurance company B and so both insurance rates rise. Then, some consumers, 
whose θ  is relatively low, have a decrease in their utilities but other consumers have an 
increase in their utilities. Further, both insurance companies increase their expected 
profits. However, if a  becomes smaller than a certain level, the quality diversity becomes 
too large and many consumers may have their utilities decreased. Thus, minimum quality 
standards may be socially desirable when a  is small. 
Second, consider the case where W  is small and/or D  is large. By assuming that each 
consumer is risk averse, even if minimum quality standards cause insurance rates to fall a 
little, their utility increases drastically. Thus, in the situation where W  is small and/or D  
is large, it is advantageous to impose minimum quality standards. 
Third, consider why the effects of iπ  and iN  are ambiguous. The reason for these is 
described as follows. An increase in iπ  and/or iN  raises a consumer’s marginal utility 
( )•′u  and so the first term in Equation (44) increases. However, at the same time, the 
second term in Equation (44) decreases because these increases lead to an increase in CN . 
Accordingly, whether or not minimum quality standards may be desirable is unclear. 
Finally, the results presented in this section point out minimum quality standards may be 
desirable when each consumer is not wealthy. Many firms have more wealth than 
individuals. Thus, generally speaking, minimum quality standards may be desirable for 
individuals but not for firms. This interpretation coincides with the fact that the Japanese 
regulator imposes more severe regulations upon the insurance market for individuals than 
for firms. 
 
Conclusions and Remarks 
 
According to Schlesinger and Schulenburg (1993), each insurance product per se is 
identical but the insurance companies that sell this identical insurance product are not 
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necessarily identical. In this study, this point can be interpreted as “aftercare” and each 
insurance company incorporates it into its own strategy. The Japanese insurance market is 
investigated where competition is not only on price (insurance rate) but also on quality 
(level of aftercare). Thus, this paper considers the insurance market with vertical 
differentiation. 
In this discussion, some light is shed on several real life questions. For example, in the 
Japanese insurance market, there are two types of insurance company. One is “domestic”, 
the other is “foreign”. It is well known that domestic insurance companies set relatively 
higher prices than foreign insurance companies. Many foreign insurance companies 
compete aggressively on prices. In contrast, domestic insurance companies focus on 
service competition instead of price competition. Namely, domestic insurance companies 
tend to offer high prices and high quality, while foreign insurance companies tend to offer 
low prices and low quality. This fact coincides with the results of this paper. 9 
In another example, as described above, minimum quality standards may be desirable 
for individuals but not for firms. Hence, to impose a different type of regulations between 
individuals and firms may be rational. Such insistence can be seen in a considerable 
number of works in the insurance field. However, the results in this paper are different 
from other researchers. Particularly, others emphasize the weakness of individuals in 
terms of information gap, bargaining power, and level of knowledge. In this paper, 
whether minimum quality standards are desirable or not is decided by the level of wealth. 
Thus, even if there were the consumers who have perfect knowledge and strong 
bargaining power, the regulator should impose some regulations for individuals. 
However, the above analysis is incomplete on several points. The following two points 
are particularly interesting. 
First, in this model, both insurance companies and consumers have perfect information. 
Thus, all insurance companies do not need to deal with adverse selection. However, in the 
real world, because they cannot verify each consumer’s type, insurance companies may 
have to decide price and quality due to tell their true types. Furthermore, assuming perfect 
information is also related to the consumer side. Recently, price information has become 
clearer because major consumers can easily compare prices using the Internet. However, 
some uncertainty remains. That price cannot be decided as long as the policy term 
continues because consumers get policy dividends at least once a year. The level of 
quality in the timing of contracts does not necessarily coincide with that in the timing of 
accidents because the policy term is normally long. 
Second, this paper explicitly analyzes the insurance market with vertical differentiation 
where aftercare is the only quality variable. However, there are, in fact, other factors that 
can be considered as quality variables. For example, the service that is offered ex ante or 
                                                        
9 There is good evidence that domestic non-life insurance companies have far more service centers to provide 
claim-handling procedures than do foreign companies. 
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interim the policy term seems to be a disregarded factor.10 Financial robustness (degree of 
solvency) will become important.11 Further, horizontal differentiation may need to be 
incorporated into the model. 
These points are still open questions. Much additional work is required to relax the 
above restrictions and they are left to possible further research. However, several results 
in this paper include important political implications for the insurance market. 
 
                                                        
10 For example, Crosby and Stephens (1987) have confirmed that consumers who had been receiving in high-level 
services before they purchase are willing to pay higher insurance premiums than consumers who had not receiving. 
11 This has been referred to in previous studies, for example, Schlesinger and Schulenburg (1991), Pritchett (1994) and 




If a consumer of type i  does not purchase an insurance product, the consumer's 
certainty equivalent, 0CE , is 
 
 ( ) 20 12 D
rDWCE iii πππ −−−= .     (A1) 
 



















rSP θππππ .   (A3) 
 
To induce the condition where all consumers purchase an insurance product, one can 
confine attention to the consumer whose θ  is zero. Substituting 0=θ  into Equation 



















.     (A4) 
 




Suppose that 1≥∗iθ . Then, the demand for insurance company B in the type i  market is 
zero. However, now insurance company B has an incentive to alter its own insurance 




~ , because it always gets additional expected profit. Thus, 1≥∗iθ  is 
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In this appendix, the simultaneous equations, shown by Equations (13) to (16), are 
solved. First using Equations (13) and (15), the following equations are derived. 
 





























π ,    (C1) 
 
 































π . (C2) 
 
Substituting Equations (C1) and (C2) in Equation (14), it can be expressed as 
 
 ( )




































Similar to above, substituting Equations (C1) and (C2) in Equation (16), then 
 
 ( )






































In order to hold Equation (C3), either equation must satisfy the following: 
 
 0=− ∗AiSD ,       (C5) 
 









AB SSSSDrqq π .  (C6) 
 
In order to hold Equation (C4), either equation must satisfy the following: 
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 0=− ∗BiSD ,       (C7) 
 
 ( ) ( )( )( ) 021
2







AB SSSSDrqq π .  (C8) 
 
Accordingly, the combinations to be satisfied with both Equations (C3) and (C4) are 
four. However, the combination (C6) and (C8) is never satisfied because the sum of 
Equations (C6) and (C8) is ( ) 03 ≠− AB qq . Thus, the remainder of this appendix is to 
check the remaining three cases. 
 
Case 1: combination (C5) and (C7) 
 





∗∗ .       (C9) 
 
Thus, both insurance companies offer full insurance. 
 
Case 2: combinations (C6) and (C7) 
 
From Equation (C7), it is given by 
 
 DS Bi =
∗ .       (C10) 
 
Substituting Equation (C10) in Equation (C6), it becomes12 
 









2 .      (C11) 
                                                        











2  is an improper solution. 
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Case 3: combination (C5) and (C8) 
 
From Equation (C5), it is given by 
 
 DS Ai =
∗ .       (C12) 
 
Substituting Equation (C12) in Equation (C8), it becomes 
 









4 .      (C13) 
 
Although there are three kinds of solutions in these simultaneous equations, Case 1 is 
the only solution for the maximization problem. The others are merely saddle-point 
solutions. To prove that, first define the second-order conditions for the maximization 
problem for insurance company A as follows: 
 


















E , 0>Δ     (C14) 
 




















































Because insurance company B has the same form, its conditions are omitted. To confirm 
the second-order condition, the following equations are derived. 
 

















,     (C15) 
 





















































E π .   (C17) 
 
Equations (C15) and (C16) are always strictly negative. However, the sign of Δ  is 













.      (C18) 
 
From Equation (C18), Case 1 is always satisfied with the second-order conditions for the 
maximization problem. 













.      (C19) 
 
From Equation (C19), Case 2 is never satisfied with the second-order conditions for the 
maximization problem. Similarly, it can be confirmed that Case 3 is also never satisfied. 
Hence, Case 1 is the only solution for the maximization problem. Finally, substituting 
Equation (C9) into Equations (C1) and (C2), all equilibrium insurance premiums (17) and 




Suppose that both insurance companies choose the same quality level q̂ . Then in the 
second stage they must offer an actuarially fair rate. Thus, their expected profits are 
 
 ( )( ) ( )( )
2
ˆˆˆ
2qaqEqE BA −=Π=Π .     (D1) 
 
For any quality level minˆ qq > , either insurance company has an incentive to lower its 
own quality because it leads not only to an increase in revenue but also to a decrease in 
quality cost. 
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For quality level minˆ qq = , their expected profits are 





aqqEqE BA −=Π=Π . Now, consider that insurance company B offers 
another quality level ε+= min~ qq , where ε  is a very small positive number. Then, the 
expected profit of insurance company B is given by 
 








B −−=Π .    (D2) 
 
In order to prove the nonexistence of a symmetric equilibrium, it must be shown that 
( )( )qE B ~Π  is larger than ( )( )minqE BΠ . Subtracting ( )( )minqE BΠ  from ( )( )qE B ~Π , it can 
be seen that 
 
 ( )( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ){ }minminmin ~98~18
1~ qqaNqqqEqE C
BB +−−=Π−Π .  (D3) 
 
Thus, if Equation (D3) is strictly positive, then 
 
 ( ) 0~98 min >+− qqaNC .      (D4) 
 






NC −<ε .      (D5) 
 
The inequality Equation (D5) is satisfied if qq <min . Hence, in the case of minˆ qq = , 
either insurance company has an incentive to change own quality level.13 
From the above description, attention can be confined to the asymmetric case, that is 
AB qq > . It is easy to calculate that 
                                                        
13  In contrast, if qq ≥min , there is no incentive to change the quality level from minˆ qq = . Thus, it has an 
uninteresting symmetric equilibrium { }minmin , qq . 
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Π∂ ∗∗ ,   (D6) 
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